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EDITOR’S SUMMARY 
Muthukrishna and Henrich argue that solving the replication crisis in psychology partly 
requires well-specified, overarching theoretical frameworks. They outline how Dual Inheritance 
Theory provides one such example that could be adopted by the field.  
ABSTRACT 
The replication crisis facing the psychological sciences is widely regarded as rooted in 
methodological or statistical shortcomings. We argue that a large part of the problem is the lack of 
a cumulative theoretical framework or frameworks. Without an overarching theoretical framework 
that generates hypotheses across diverse domains, empirical programs spawn and grow from 
personal intuitions and culturally-biased folk theories. By providing ways to develop clear 
predictions, including through the use of formal modelling, theoretical frameworks set 
expectations that determine whether a new finding is confirmatory, nicely integrating with existing 
lines of research, or surprising, and therefore requiring further replication and scrutiny. Such 
frameworks also prioritize certain research foci, motivate the use diverse empirical approaches 
and, often, provide a natural means to integrate across the sciences. Thus, overarching theoretical 
frameworks pave the way toward a more general theory of human behaviour. We illustrate one 
such a theoretical framework: Dual Inheritance Theory.  
The psychological and behavioural sciences have a problem. By some accounts, half the 
literature doesn’t replicate1 and we don’t know if the other half replicates for the 88% of our 
species who don’t live in Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic (WEIRD) societies2. 
Although a few researchers insist that all is well3, most psychologists acknowledge that a crisis 
exists and seem to blame it on poor methodological and statistical practices. This leads to proposed 
solutions like study pre-registration and better reporting policies4. We don’t disagree that 
psychology’s norms are indeed substandard and that methodological improvements are much 
needed. Nevertheless, we argue that the crisis runs much deeper and is ultimately rooted in theory 
or lack thereof. Many subfields within psychology (though not all!) lack any overarching, 
integrative general theoretical framework that would allow researchers to derive specific 
predictions from more general premises. Without a general theoretical framework, results are 
neither expected nor unexpected based on how they fit into the general theory and have no 
implications for what we expect in other domains.  
This situation is thrown into stark relief by comparing psychology textbooks with those in 
other sciences. Rather than building up principles that flow from overarching theoretical 
frameworks, psychology textbooks are largely a potpourri of disconnected empirical findings on 
topics that have been popular at some point in the discipline’s history, and clustered based on 
largely American and European folk categories. Outside of psychology, useful theoretical 
frameworks tell scientists not only what to expect, but also what not to expect. They show the 
interconnections between theories. Understanding the mechanisms behind one phenomenon 
informs research in other areas, often limiting the likely hypotheses or strongly favoring some 
hypotheses over others. Each empirical result reverberates through the interconnected web of our 
understanding of a domain. Collectively, these interconnected theories tune our intuitions, so we 
know when something feels “off”. When neutrinos appeared to be travelling faster than the speed 
of light5, researchers strongly suspected that something was wrong because this violated the 
Theory of Special Relativity, which had so nicely accounted for other aspects of the universe. If 
vinegar and baking soda combined in your child’s model volcano didn’t produce carbon dioxide 
and hot ice solution, we suspect something is probably wrong, because this would violate the 
Periodic Table and “Collision Theory”. If we discover fossil rabbits which appear to have 
originated in the Precambrian era, we would suspect something was wrong, because it conflicts 
with a cumulative understanding of how species evolved that has nothing to do with previous 
Precambrian finds per se, but rather with a broad understanding of evolutionary change over time 
based on how the other pieces fit together.  
In contrast, even when derived from a circumscribed theory (e.g. Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory6), much psychological research is typically specific and difficult to connect—let alone 
challenge or support—other findings or theories in the field (e.g. Terror Management Theory7). 
Rarely does it contribute to a more general theory of human behavior. Consider this research 
question: do undergraduates walk slower when they’re reminded of the elderly8? Does this violate 
a Theory of Human Behavior? What if they walk faster or ambulate unperturbed9? Can we 
generalize this to all adult humans? Similarly, if studies show that humans, or at least Americans, 
prefer fewer choices to many10, does this violate any theory at all? What if Germans prefer fewer 
choices or show no preference11? Is that a failed replication, another butterfly to be added to the 
collection of cross-cultural differences, or a confirmation of theory predicting certain kinds of 
psychological variation?  
With decades of data now under suspicion, without a general and unifying theory of human 
behavior, we have no principled way to navigate this morass. Pre-registration and multiple 
replications with larger samples, though a laudable practice, is not a feasible solution to assessing 
many lifetimes worth of studies. Moreover, without a unifying theoretical framework, we don’t 
know whether we should expect the results to replicate with older individuals, poorer individuals, 
or individuals in other societies. And without such a framework, even after the onerous replication 
effort, doubt remains as to whether one of the infinite space of moderators explains the lack of 
replication. To understand the importance of theory to data and data to theory, it’s worth 
remembering the abductive challenge. 
THE ABDUCTIVE PROCESS 
Science is built up of facts, as a house is built of stones; but an accumulation of facts is no 
more a science than a heap of stones is a house.12  
The present methodological and statistical solutions to the replication crisis will only help 
ensure solid stones; they don’t help us build the house. For that, we need the scaffolding of 
integrative and cumulative theory. Working without theory leaves us predicting the future based 
on past results. This is like predicting the position of a planet based on where it was last time. We 
want to get to celestial mechanics, but that requires using the data to develop the physics of 
planetary motion in an abductive process.  
The scientific process proceeds closer to what Charles Peirce called “abduction” – 
inference to the best explanation – than clean induction or deduction. When faced with a 
phenomenon, we are faced with incomplete data and a large to infinite space of possible 
hypotheses. Consider a stylized example of a broken vase in a room. What caused the vase to 
break? One might observe the environment to create a list of possible explanations – the open 
window, the cat no longer in her basket, the suspiciously quiet toddler watching TV in the next 
room, and so on. To reduce this space, we may engage in experimentation by placing another vase 
next to the open window; in ethnographic observation by observing the cat’s behavioural patterns; 
or in an ethological study by interrogating the toddler and observing their reaction to the broken 
vase. The hypothesis space for any real phenomenon is much larger, but even in our hypothetical 
space, better theory can far reduce the possible or likely hypotheses and offer explanations we 
might not consider based on the data alone. Knowing the direction of the window and wind force 
required to topple a vase can set appropriate priors for that hypothesis; as can understanding how 
high cats can jump and the toddler’s television schedule. Further data collection informs and 
contributes to these theories. 
For more complex phenomenon – why people are religious, the source of ingroup 
favouritism and outgroup discrimination, and our heuristics and biases and the contexts of their 
use, the space of possible explanations is impossibly larger, and we cannot hope to build a 
cumulative science by narrowing it down with guesswork, folk intuitions, verbal logic, or our own 
limited life experience. A good theoretical framework helps reduce that space. Experiments are 
arguably the last resort after competing theoretical predictions cannot be distinguished with 
existing evidence, requiring us to devote resources to a large, well-powered, decisive experiment. 
The alternative approach leaves us running half a dozen studies with minor variations to eliminate 
the space of the possible as delimited by the poverty of the researcher’s imagination. Such 
elimination by experimentation is far too inefficient given the need for diverse and reasonable 
sized samples. In best cases, it is also unlikely to lead to structured cumulative knowledge and in 
common cases, it can often be systematically misleading.  
Many creative hypotheses have been drawn from the imaginations of researchers from 
societies that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD), but there is 
a certain circularity to testing these WEIRD intuitions on WEIRD participants that can mislead us 
into believing we are drawing closer to a deeper and more general understanding of human 
behaviour. Such an approach led us to believe that fairness means sharing equally in the Ultimatum 
Game – ubiquitous behaviour in many convenient WEIRD samples – and even attempts to explain 
how this was part of our evolved psychology. Instead fairness norms systematically vary across 
societies.13 Such an approach led us to believe that facial processing occurs in the right hemisphere 
of the brain. Instead, strong facial hemispheric lateralization is only present in literate populations, 
where some of the left hemisphere facial fusiform gyrus was co-opted to allow us to read.14,15 As 
the world approaches 100% literacy, a psychologist from Venus armed with early 21st century 
atheoretical approaches to understanding human cognition and with no knowledge of the history 
of literacy, might discover the Visual Word Form Area and discuss the reading instinct among 
Homo sapiens just as we do with numeracy, colour perception, and the ability to reason. Is there a 
better approach to developing theoretical explanations? 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, THEORIES, HYPOTHESES, AND DATA  
The scientific and vernacular meaning of theory are often blurred, particularly in the human 
sciences. For clarity, we need to distinguish between theoretical frameworks, theories, hypotheses, 
and data. We will also discuss why it’s useful to formalize theories and to distinguish between 
levels of explanation.  
Theoretical frameworks are a broad body of connected theories. Darwin’s theory of 
framework. Within the Darwinian framework, multiple theories can be developed that explain 
some overlapping set of phenomena. For example, there are several competing and complementary 
theories to explain the evolution of altruism in different species and contexts16. These theories are 
general, unifying explanations for a wide array of available data that allow us to generate additional 
testable, falsifiable hypotheses—predictions which allow us to exclude and distinguish between 
competing theories within the broad framework. These predictions are instantiated in more specific 
hypotheses that link to mechanisms, which can then be tested using data derived from experiments 
or other methods of causal inference17. There different ways in which theories can be expressed. 
Natural Selection as a theory of evolution was first expressed as a verbal argument18. But, 
evolutionary theory has come a long way in the century and a half since the first of Darwin’s 
classics. For example, we now know about genetics and have a much better understanding of the 
many processes through which species diversify and evolve. Since the Modern Synthesis, 
evolutionary biology has expressed its theories using analytical and computational models. There 
are good reasons for why these are useful tools for theory building.  
In contrast to high fidelity engineering simulations19, quantitative stock market 
predictions20, or probabilistic facial recognition models21, many scientists use formal models as 
aids to thinking through the logic of an argument in order to offer comparative statics, making 
testable qualitative, but directional predictions about phenomena22-31. By formally defining 
assumptions, logic, and predictions, anyone can challenge the theory by either testing the 
predictions or by challenging or modifying the assumptions or logic and showing how the 
predictions would change. Such models, whether analytical or computational, can be thought of as 
aids to thinking, allowing us to work through the logic and assumptions of systems more complex 
than our minds can fully represent. And it doesn’t take much before this limit is reached. For 
example, inclusive fitness or kin selection seems like a plausible explanation for cooperation 
among relatives—as long as the genealogical relatedness multiplied by the benefit to the recipient 
(𝑟 × 𝑏) is greater than the personal cost (𝑐), genes for altruism will spread (Hamilton’s rule32; 𝑟𝑏 >𝑐). What’s less obvious without working through the models is why this explanation might only 
apply under conditions of weak selection33, why specific and generalized versions reach different 
conclusions34,35, or indeed the debates around these. An even simpler algebraic example of our 
cognitive limits, sometimes called the “potato paradox”, is as follows: “You have 100kg of 
potatoes, which are 99% water by weight. You let them dehydrate until they're 98% water. How 
much do they weigh now?” The answer of 50kg is surprising until you work through the algebra. 
Once you do, the answer seems obvious, tuning our intuitions. Our intuitions can also be shaped 
by considering levels of explanation. 
Levels of explanation, such as the ultimate-proximate heuristic, or Tinbergen’s four 
questions for levels of analysis, are useful distinctions in evolutionary biology. Proximate 
explanations describe the mechanisms for a phenomenon, whereas Ultimate explanations describe 
why the phenomenon exists in the first place. A simple illustration is the question of why we enjoy 
sexual intercourse. A proximate explanation would be something like, “We enjoy pleasurable 
activities and sex is pleasurable”. We could understand this phenomenon in more detail using the 
tools of neuroscience – when we have sex, oxytocin, dopamine, and other neurochemicals 
associated with pleasure are released, creating a feeling of euphoria and reinforcing the behaviour. 
However, none of this tells us why sex and not banging your head against a tree is associated with 
pleasure. An ultimate explanation would be something like, “Sex is associated with procreation. 
Animals who enjoyed sex, had more sex, and left more offspring. Animals who preferred banging 
their heads against a tree instead, left fewer offspring and this preference is no longer with us”.  
A more complex example is why religions tend to be pro-fertility36. Proximate explanations 
describe the value of family and community, offering meaning through procreation, and so on. An 
ultimate explanation reveals how religions that promote fertility grow at the expense of those that 
do not36. If you’re American, you may have Quaker friends, probably have Mormon friends, but 
are unlikely to have Shaking Quaker (Shaker) friends. Mormons, who promoted large families and 
at one-point polygamy, grew very quickly to 16 million US members. Quakers have attitudes 
similar to non-religious Americans and have under 100,000 US members. In stark contrast, the 
Shakers, an offshoot of the Quakers, promoted total celibacy. The Shakers are no longer with us37. 
The levels interact and sometimes blur (see examples14,38,39), but some have questioned 
how useful evolutionary models are for phenomena like memory or vision. It’s true that often very 
high-level functional predictions are used in psychology, but the precision of predictions from 
evolution about the specifics of mechanisms hinges on the amount of phylogenetic and 
developmental genetic information available. In bird species, for example, if ecological shifts 
functionally predict greater male polygyny, you can predict this will result in particular patterns of 
testosterone regulation (a proximate mechanism, phylogenetically conserved)40. Similarly, 
knowing that human brains are mostly scaled-up primate brains informs the space of possibilities 
by telling us a lot about what natural selection has to work with in producing human faculties41. 
A general theory of human behaviour would be evolutionarily plausible (via natural 
selection under phylogenetic constraints), often utilize formal models, and provide us with an 
ultimate framework that delivers proximate predictions. In addition to being a crucial part of the 
abductive scientific process, by forcing, often formally, statements of assumptions and logic, 
constrained by the broader web of interconnected work, such a framework also contributes to one 
of the goals of the replication renaissance42 – constraining researchers. Rigorous formal theory 
may also be a way to evaluate the existing literature for plausibility based on connections to well-
established theories and data. It additionally creates a space for theoretical psychologists producing 
papers that formally develop theories on the back of previous theories to offer strong predictions 
– a publishable form of pre-registration with greater justification than “we expect this based on 
our pilot data, past experimental data, life experience, or best guess”. What might such a theory 
look like? 
AN ILLUSTRATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Dual Inheritance Theory, Culture-Gene Coevolutionary Theory, and the expansions in the 
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis provides a general theoretical framework for the study of human 
behaviour – a theory of human behaviour to unify the psychological and behavioural 
sciences14,25,39,43-45. The framework draws on the insight of many scientists, ranging from Charles 
Darwin and Adam Smith to James Baldwin and Donald Campbell46-48. It seats humans within the 
natural world while expanding the toolkit of evolutionary biology to tackle unique aspects of our 
species, including cumulative culture, social norms, technological change, and institutions. Unlike 
common applications of evolutionary theory within psychology, this approach is consistent with 
the rest of the biological sciences, emphasizing the formal modelling of both genetic and cultural 
evolutionary processes and considering how each influences aspects of psychology with potential 
feedback loops between culture, genes, and cultural products like institutions, tools, languages, 
and psychology. Rather than offering primarily post-hoc explanations for existing phenomena 
based on verbally described evolutionary logic and assumed ancestral conditions, it makes specific 
a priori predictions about our psychology (as well as temporal and population-level variation in 
that psychology2), which can be (and have been) tested experimentally and observationally14,39,45. 
The approach is relevant to tackling the WEIRD People Problem2 by testing predicted patterns of 
cross-cultural and lifespan variation rather than arbitrarily exploring less WEIRD49 sites based on 
access. We know of no other approach capable of explaining the immense global psychological 
variation that’s recently been documented. 
In the 1970s and 1980s several researchers began to adapt the mathematics that had been 
so profitable in evolutionary biology to understand learning and cultural evolution25,44,50,51. One 
key theoretical insight was to study the evolution of our learning capacities by asking under what 
conditions or what circumstances natural selection would favour different kinds of learning versus 
simply inscribing behaviour into genetically programmed developmental processes. An 
autocatalytic model25 revealed a Goldilocks’ zone of intermediate environmental variability where 
the knowledge acquired by parents and grandparents was worth paying attention to despite the 
learning costs. At one extreme, constantly changing environments require individual trial and error 
learning while at the other extreme, highly stable environments could be most efficiently navigated 
by genetically-encoded adaptations. As the data a decade later revealed, between these extremes 
were precisely the conditions in which our ancestors evolved52,53. Subsequent theory and 
experiments expanded our understanding of the features of this reliance on social learning—from 
copying without understanding (high fidelity transmission), to selectively copying successful 
others (pay-off bias), second-order copying (such as copying who others were copying; prestige 
bias), to copying majorities and pluralities (conformist bias). With moderators, such as changing 
frequencies, self-relevance, sincerity, and differentially in different domains; to the evolution of 
an ethnic psychology identifying groups; and a norm psychology for identifying norms and 
punishing norm violators, and so on14,39,45,54. Over time these processes led to information 
accumulating to the point where not even the brightest among us could recreate the world we lived 
in. And it led to our psychology and biology being shaped in ways that relied on a rich cultural 
environment that needed to be acquired. Cooking is a clear and compelling example; our guts are 
too short to survive on raw foods and we can’t instinctively distinguish poisonous from edible 
plants. Yet as the culinary habits of many college students attest, fire-making and cooking are not 
innate, reliably developing skills.  
Together, the formal models underlying these theories offered a theoretical framework to 
explain human behaviour. Humans, the models suggested, were a new kind of animal, the result 
of at least two lines of inheritance – a genetic line possessed by all species, and a cumulative 
cultural line unique to us. These “cultural evolutionary” models of our psychology and behaviour 
are not analogies of natural selection, population biology, or epidemiology. Rather than a 
metaphor, they are an example of science proceeding as usual; an extension of natural selection 
into the realm of human behaviour. 
These models made specific, testable predictions. For example, social learning would be 
favoured when individual learning was costly; humans had an evolved suite of strategies and biases 
that homed in on the individuals and behaviours with the highest payoff; with individuals 
deploying these biases, the majority would come to possess a suite of adaptive behaviours that 
could be copied. And, it was not simply that our species would copy majorities (which Asch and 
others had begun empirically demonstrating three decades earlier), but that they would specifically 
do so at a rate higher than the majority – if 60% of your colleagues use SPSS, you have a greater 
than 60% probability of also doing so. Or, you might leave SPSS for R, if you discover your most 
productive and prestigious colleague is using R. Over the following decades, these predictions 
were tested using the historical and ethnographic record, as well as both field and laboratory 
experiments14. Here, we illustrate these ideas with two examples from our own work – conformity 
and choice. 
EXAMPLES: CONFORMITY AND CHOICE 
Asch’s seminal line experiments suggested a simple truth: humans tend to conform to 
majorities. In the half century since the original studies were published, hundreds of experiments 
have sought to establish the bounds of conformity with more, and more nuanced, moderators 
identifying when people do and do not conform, distinguishing between normative and 
informational conformity, identifying which people are more likely to conform, when conformity 
will be internalized, and so on for many combinations and interactions55,56. New hypothetical 
permutations are limited only by the poverty of the researcher’s imagination; science proceeding 
as a process of hypothesis by imagination and elimination by experimentation. However, because 
it emerged from a particular experimental paradigm and was only descriptively theorized, the 
conformity literature has had limited integration with the literatures on persuasion, attitude change, 
observational learning, childhood imitation or rational decision-making.  
In contrast, Dual Inheritance Theory began by asking a fundamental question about 
learning: when do people use social learning over individual learning, who do they attend to for 
this learning, and how do they integrate information from other people. This led to the prediction 
of frequency of different behaviours as a cue about which behaviour, motivation or belief to adopt. 
To explore this, researcher’s developed formal models, including both analytical models and 
simulations, that permitted conformist learning strategies to compete against other forms of 
learning25. Rather than simply claiming that “humans will copy majorities”, these conformist 
transmission models make a specific prediction – that humans will, under particular conditions, 
copy majorities at a rate greater than the rate of the behaviour in the population (e.g. a 70% majority 
will have a greater than 70% probability of being copied); thus, conformity will follow a sigmoidal 
curve (see Figure 1a and Figure 1b). These specific predictions, down to the sigmoidal signature 
of expected behaviour, have been repeatedly demonstrated57-59. This non-linear pattern of learning 
is non-obvious; we may have never discovered it without a mathematical model. But with advances 
in theory and growing evidence, a result that violated these predictions would be surprising, but 
publishable in either case, either confirming a specific prediction derived from a general theory 
(not surprising, but important for cumulative science), or a potentially more important result that 
violates the evolutionary logic captured by the models. The size of the splash would depend not 
on how much the results violated people’s personal intuitions, but on how many other theoretical 
predictions and results they brought into question. Such results would invoke extra scrutiny not 
because they challenged results that gained primacy by temporal precedence in publication, but 
because they challenged a theory derived from a framework that had made so many other well-
tested predictions. 
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Figure 1 | Graphs showing theoretical predictions and empirical data for the conformist 
transmission bias and the shape of the conformist curve with different numbers of choices. 
(a) A sigmoidal curve of the form Pr[Copying] = 𝟏𝟏+𝒆−𝜶(𝒃𝟏−𝒄) where 𝒃𝟏 is the percentage of the 
population with Behavior 1 (of two behaviors), 𝒄 is the point at which the probability of 
copying is 50% (𝒄 = 𝟓𝟎% for two traits) and 𝜶 determines the strength of conformity; a 
larger 𝜶 implies that a majority has a larger social influence. The formal prediction is that 𝜶 > 𝟓. These models also specify moderators, such as the size of the population, accuracy of 
the size of the majority (“transmission fidelity”) or the importance of the decision (“payoff”). 
(b) A typical sigmoidal curve from Morgan et al. 58 Figure 2c; reproduced with permission. 
(b) Theory (solid line) vs data (points) from Muthukrishna et al. 57 for the effect of number 
of choices on the 𝒄  term of the sigmoidal conformist curve (required plurality for the 
probability of conforming to reach 50%). The data matches the expected pattern, but 
suggests a prior (raising the 𝒄 cutoff in the experimental data above the theoretical line). This 
prior was present in the experiment, but was flat in the theory; an example of science in 
action—theory informing experiments and experiments informing theory. 
Later theories should build on existing theories. Consider an example from the psychology 
of choice. One notable line of research began with a question of whether humans prefer or are 
more likely to make an economic decision with more or less choice10. We use this question as an 
illustration, but it is not unique – the question has many characteristics of a common approach – a 
hypothesis drawn from a researcher’s own life experience (e.g. choice when shopping), with a 
desire to show something ‘sexy’ or counterintuitive (that less choice reduces anxiety contra 
intuitions). This approach has many disadvantages: from WEIRD psychologists using their 
WEIRD intuitions to generate the alternative hypotheses, contexts, and bounds of the phenomena 
to the WEIRD participants used to test hypotheses to the specificity of the question itself. A recent 
meta-analysis11 found an effect size of effectively zero for the “paradox of choice”, but suggested 
that some missing moderators may yet reliably explain positive findings. But which moderators? 
And can these reliably be determined by researchers’ mental models and life experience?  
From a Dual Inheritance Theory perspective, the question itself is either nonsensical or 
underspecified. Perhaps in a narrower applied setting, we can gain purchase on when people are 
more likely to make a purchase, but even here, the guidance of a theoretical framework is useful – 
what is the domain, how important is it, and so on. From a Dual Inheritance Theory perspective, 
our species has had to make decisions with different numbers of choices to survive. Our decision-
making strategy will be affected by the importance of the choice (e.g. a consumer reaction to, “30 
mortgage options?” of “I guess I don’t need to buy a house,” is clearly crazy given the importance 
of the decision), by the information they have available (e.g. the decisions of others) and indeed, 
by the number of choices.  
In contrast to the common approach discussed above, Nakahashi, Wakano and Henrich60 
extend the well-established theories of conformity discussed previously to show that the strength 
of conformist transmission is affected by the number of choices. The same sized plurality will 
more likely be copied as the number of choices increases, changing the shape of the conformist 
curve. Theory can also often tune our intuitions in a way that can often be simply expressed (though 
without important subtleties, one of which is the role of priors in this case)—one aspect of the 
theory is that as the number of choices (𝑁) increases, choosing any one by chance decreases with 
the reciprocal of the number of choices (1𝑁), so the same consensus on one option is a stronger 
signal for a greater number of options. Your probability of choosing SPSS with a 60% majority 
will be even higher if you discover that the space of possible choices includes not just R, but also 
SAS, Stata, Python, and Julia. When tested, the model performed exceptionally well (Figure 1c), 
but also revealed gaps in the theory57; science proceeding as usual – theory informing data and 
vice versa. 
OTHER THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
There are of course theoretical frameworks within psychology and other behavioral 
sciences, though we are perhaps biased in arguing that these too would benefit from integration or 
even competition with Dual Inheritance Theory. A prominent example of such a framework exists 
within economics. The much maligned models of ‘economic man’ or Homo Economicus are a 
theory of human behaviour borne out of 19th century philosophy61 and formalized using physics-
inspired approaches complete with metaphors of friction and elasticity. Homo Economicus 
conforms to the requirements of a scientific theory and its assumptions may even make sense in 
some circumstances. In others, its predictions have been challenged and better models have been 
built with more realistic assumptions that produce different predictions62-65. These predictions are 
eminently challengeable, because they are formal theoretical predictions easily falsified by the 
various experiments in the behavioural economics revolution. 
Economic models may serve as the Hardy-Weinberg models of human behavior, with 
assumptions that fit in the absence of culture (indeed, Homo Economicus may be a better model 
for chimpanzees; Pan Economicus66). Perhaps due to the formal theory and self-critical statistical 
and methodological norms of the Credibility Revolution67, behavioral economics replicates 
slightly better than the psychological sciences68. The economic approach may be helpful for 
modeling psychological mechanisms, but would benefit from further constraints on what goes into 
the model. Rather than including features that affect utility based on WEIRD intuitions, these 
features would instead be drawn from the web of interconnected evolutionary models that make 
behavioural predictions. That is, building psychological models from first principles that fit within 
the scaffolding of a general theoretical framework (for examples, see 69,70).  
Within psychology and the broader behavioural sciences too, there are many pockets that 
have, and are currently, developing and deploying overarching frameworks, often embedded in 
formal models, that make clear predictions and drive productive research. For example, theories 
of dual process71, perception72,73, reinforcement learning74, and Bayesian models of cognition75. 
We hope that the frameworks we discuss might inform these theoretical approaches as well, but 
more critically, we hope that shining a light on the problem in theory might also shine a light on 
the best examples of theory within psychology. 
CRITIQUES AND CONCERNS 
Here, we argue that researchers in the psychological and behavioural sciences need to adopt 
or develop overarching theoretical frameworks and that the failure to operate in such frameworks 
is central to both the replication crisis and building a more cumulative science. To illustrate, we 
discussed one example of such a theoretical framework and suggested that it could help unify large 
swaths of the psychological and behavioural sciences. But, of course, we think the field is wide 
open and many options should be explored. We are also implicitly advocating a standard abductive 
scientific approach. This approach should not be controversial, but nevertheless is. Here we outline 
some of the critiques and concerns we have encountered. 
Other fields are suffering from the replication crisis too. The fields hardest hit by the 
replication crisis are the least theoretical subfields of psychology, such as social psychology1, and 
applied fields such as the medical sciences76,77. Like social psychology, the medical sciences lack 
an overarching theoretical framework. And likewise, medical researchers and evolutionary 
scientists working at the interface to medicine have made a parallel case for improving the medical 
sciences through better theory78-82.  
What about all the findings that have stood the test of time? It’s not the case that we 
cannot learn anything in the absence of theory, any more than we knew nothing about chemistry 
before Mendeleev’s periodic table or biology before Darwin’s theory of evolution. Significant and 
useful knowledge accumulated prior to these theoretical advancements, such as gunpowder and 
animal breeding. However, these theories and the partial theories that came before them helped 
make sense of the otherwise disconnected data and helped distinguish findings that were likely to 
stand the test of time from those that will probably not. As was the case in these fields, some 
previous knowledge will line up nicely with an emerging theoretical framework (animal breeding), 
while others will be discounted (the alchemy of lead into gold), and others nuanced (alchemy 
changing one chemical into another).  
What about applied science? In an applied context, such as pharmaceutical trials, testing 
St John’s wort, Viagra, or ramipril and showing their efficacy works regardless of origins in 
traditional knowledge, past side effects, or chemical similarity to previous drugs. Mini-theories 
and hypotheses based on intuitions or past data can be useful and the applied science of drug safety 
and efficacy have established useful best practices, such as pre-registration, for identifying the 
presence and size of an effect and preventing changing hypotheses after seeing the results83. 
However, it is worth nothing that they have not completely solved the replication crisis in these 
fields76,77.  
In a basic science context, in principle these hypotheses or mini-theories could coalesce 
into a larger overarching theory, but in practice avoidance of others’ mini-theories84 and a lack of 
common methods can slow down or prevent a cumulative process. One key advantage to relying 
on theories of human behaviour in the quest for a cumulative science is that they allow us to 
interpret past findings in the way that the Periodic Table allowed us to interpret pre-Mendeleev 
chemical (and alchemical) experiments. We want to move beyond a science that only applies to 
American undergraduates or Mechanical Turks. 
We’re not trained to think this way. It is true that many psychologists have less 
mathematical training than some other social sciences, such as in economics, and certainly less 
than many physical sciences. However, it is also true that our forebears were not trained in statistics 
that are moving from useful to mandatory in modern psychology. A generation ago this resistance 
would have applied to the use of anything beyond a t-test and maybe ANOVA. We have an 
obligation to offer our students the best available tools. There are also many researchers within 
and outside psychology who have focused on developing behavioural theories that have yet to be 
tested using our rich empirical toolkit. Psychology departments need to train students for the 21st 
century and consider hiring theoretical psychologists.  
What can evolutionary biology offer beyond what’s offered by neuroscience? 
Behavioural scientists may not care about what led to the present state of our species, but only how 
it operates, and thus may be more convinced by the utility of neuroscience than evolutionary 
biology. But this assumes that mapping the brain reveals our psychology and behaviour. Humans 
are a highly cultural species and our brains are as individually and culturally variable as we are. If 
we are a new kind of animal dependent on two or more lines of inheritance, one of which is culture, 
neuroscience offers just another way to measure what manifests in our thinking and behaviour.  
There are many examples illustrating these neural differences85. For English speakers 
reading letters, the superior temporal gyrus is activated86; for Chinese speakers, it’s the dorsal 
extent of the inferior parietal lobe87. In a Theory of Mind task, Americans showed greater 
activation in the right insula, the bilateral temporoparietal junction and the right dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex; bilingual Japanese showed greater activation in the right orbital frontal gyrus88. 
Even within the same population, rich, educated brains look different than a more representative 
sample89. In one study, holding someone’s hand, even the hand of a stranger attenuated a neural 
response to threat90 – the effect was stronger in stronger marriages. But as it turns out strangers 
and stronger marriages only attenuate threat if you’re a wealthy, well-educated white woman91. 
Cultural differences are biologically and neurologically manifested, so looking at brains, hormones 
or biological measures doesn’t get past the influence of culture and cultural evolution. 
Can’t we solve this problem with Bayesian statistics? Frequentist and Bayesian 
approaches will tend to give the same answer with uninformative priors. The trouble is having a 
justifiable reason for one prior over another, opening new researcher degrees of freedom for 
Bayesian b-hacking92. But a Bayesian approach is ideal when we have a priori theory tested by 
empirical data to inform our prior. Indeed, many cosmologists dealing with one of the messier 
fields of physics, are only now moving from frequentist to Bayesian statistics, because Bayesian 
approaches offer more powerful tools for testing their now more well-defined theories with less 
than ideal datasets93. 
Can’t we solve this problem with Big Data? In the age of Big Data, we can perhaps be 
surer of our findings – gather solider stones – but lack of theory is just as concerning. Even when 
you can download and run your analysis on the world, prediction or even description doesn’t mean 
explanation. The space of possible hypotheses and theories remains impossibly large even when 
your dataset grows. Even if we’re now very sure two variables co-vary in the dataset, without 
knowing why, we have no way of knowing if the relationship will hold in other populations or 
over time. None of this of course diminishes the importance of data or the value of Big Data 
approaches, especially for applied problems that are purely about prediction. But, if we want to 
understand the world, Big Data needs Big Theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Some subfields of psychology have traditionally placed a premium on slick studies with 
surprising results. But ‘surprising’ should occur with reference to particular hypotheses derived 
from a broader general theory, not based on folk intuitions and theories derived from one’s own 
life experience. Compounding the problem, most psychologists are WEIRD; their lives and 
intuitions often differ in dramatic ways from those of people in most societies, undercutting our 
efforts to accumulate knowledge, build a body of theory, and understand human minds and brains 
more generally2. Although there is increasing recognition of the WEIRD people problem and need 
for more diverse samples94, even carefully cataloguing these cross-cultural differences brings us 
no closer to understanding the sources of those differences. Moreover, humans vary between and 
within societies95. Without an underlying theoretical framework from which to draw hypotheses 
and tune our intuitions, it is difficult to distinguish results that are unusual and interesting, from 
results that are unusual and probably wrong. 
We use Dual Inheritance Theory and its extensions as an example of a theoretical 
framework and though it is not the only one, there are arguably advantages to an evolutionary 
approach. Humans are an evolved species and Dobzhansky’s96 maxim applies as much to our 
psychology as to our anatomy and physiology—Nothing makes sense except in the light of 
evolution. Like all other species on the planet, all aspects of our behaviour must in some way flow 
from the evolutionary processes that led to our present state. Dual Inheritance Theory, Culture-
Gene Coevolutionary Theory and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’s growing body of 
theoretical and empirical research offers several predictions and exclusions for our psychology.  
Evolutionary approaches have explicitly theorized about learning, cultural evolution, 
conflicting incentives, competition, ecological effects, and the interaction between genes and 
culture14,25,97-105. In addition to traditional domains, such as mating, kinship, and reciprocity, recent 
evolutionary theory integrates insights on several topics germane to psychology106. These 
frameworks also allow us to connect otherwise disparate areas of research. For example, research 
on social learning can help us understand imitation in children and adults, and the many biases in 
social influence, conformity, and persuasion57,58,107-111. Research on norm psychology can shed 
light on other aspects of social influence, conformity, and persuasion, as well as the content of 
stereotypes and attitudes112-114. Research on our ethnic psychology informs research on 
cooperation, stereotyping, essentialism, intergroup conflict, and prosocial behavior115-121. Other 
integrative research informs core topics such as motivation101,122,123, decision-making biases, 
individual-differences, language, and intelligence57,108,124-128. 
This approach seamlessly integrates the biological and social sciences. The same 
techniques can be used to study cetaceans129, fish130, apes111 and past and future humans128,131. The 
social sciences can also begin to inform the biological sciences through what shapes cultural, 
epigenetic, and microbiome effects. For example, the selection pressure for larger human 
brains128,131 can explain why emergency Cesareans and other birth interventions are best predicted 
by head size132. Cesareans may remove a physical barrier to larger brains, but at the cost of 
reducing the mother to child microbiome inheritance133. Institutional and political structures can 
have multigenerational epigenetic effects on physical134 and mental health135.  
Our expanding understanding of the evolution of our norm psychology112 and ethnic 
psychology115, are beginning to help us theorize about the line between norms and institutions, 
answering questions about cross-national differences in corruption136,137, switching between 
norms138, and the relationships between formal and informal institutions. For example, the 
Church’s ban on polygynous marriage and the subsequent impact on normative monogamy on 
testosterone, patience, risking taking, crime and rise of democratic institutions139. This research 
has implications for law, political science, economics, and history from individual cognition to 
societal institutions and back again. New projects are also bringing the humanities to bear on long-
standing questions by building large databases in religion and cultural evolution140,141. The first 
step on this ladder integrating the human sciences is building on this general theory of human 
behaviour, but there are many steps to go. Drawing from and contributing to these theories allows 
us to make sense of decades of now distrusted data, repair our reputation, and move toward a more 
general understanding of human psychology and behaviour.  
REFERENCES 
1 Open Science Collaboration. Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 
349, aac4716 (2015). 
2 Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 33, 61-83 (2010). 
3 Gilbert, D. T., King, G., Pettigrew, S. & Wilson, T. D. Comment on “Estimating the 
reproducibility of psychological science”. Science 351, 1037-1037 (2016). 
4 Munafò, M. R. et al. A manifesto for reproducible science. Nature Human Behaviour 1, 0021, 
doi:10.1038/s41562-016-0021 (2017). 
5 Agafonova, N. et al. Measurement of the neutrino velocity with the OPERA detector in the 
CNGS beam. JHEP 1210, 093, doi:10.1007/JHEP10(2012)093 (2012). 
6 Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Vol. 2 (Stanford university press, 1962). 
7 Solomon, S., Greenberg, J. & Pyszczynski, T. in Advances in experimental social psychology Vol. 24    
93-159 (Elsevier, 1991). 
8 Bargh, J. A., Chen, M. & Burrows, L. Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait 
construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of personality and social psychology 71, 230 
(1996). 
9 Doyen, S., Klein, O., Pichon, C.-L. & Cleeremans, A. Behavioral Priming: It's All in the Mind, 
but Whose Mind? PLoS ONE 7, e29081, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081 (2012). 
10 Schwartz, B. & Kliban, K. The paradox of choice: Why more is less.  (Ecco, 2004). 
11 Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R. & Todd, P. M. Can there ever be too many options? A 
meta‐analytic review of choice overload. Journal of Consumer Research 37, 409-425 (2010). 
12 Poincaré, H. Science and hypothesis.  (Science Press, 1905). 
13 Henrich, J. et al. Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and 
punishment. Science 327, 1480-1484 (2010). 
14 Henrich, J. The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and 
making us smarter.  (Princeton University Press, 2016). 
15 Dehaene, S. Reading in the brain: The new science of how we read.  (Penguin, 2009). 
16 Fletcher, J. A. & Doebeli, M. A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276, 13-19, doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0829 (2009). 
17 Shipley, B. Cause and correlation in biology: a user's guide to path analysis, structural equations and causal 
inference with R.  (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
18 Darwin, C. On the origins of species by means of natural selection. London: Murray (1859). 
19 MSC Software. Dytran, <http://www.mscsoftware.com/product/dytran> (2004). 
20 Chan, E. Quantitative trading: how to build your own algorithmic trading business. Vol. 430 (John Wiley 
& Sons, 2009). 
21 Liu, C. & Wechsler, H. Gabor feature based classification using the enhanced fisher linear 
discriminant model for face recognition. Image processing, IEEE Transactions on 11, 467-476 
(2002). 
22 Hastie, R. & Kameda, T. The Robust Beauty of Majority Rules in Group Decisions. Psychological 
Review 112, 494-508, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.112.2.494 (2005). 
23 Kendal, J., Giraldeau, L.-A. & Laland, K. The evolution of social learning rules: payoff-biased 
and frequency-dependent biased transmission. Journal of Theoretical Biology 260, 210-219 (2009). 
24 Aoki, K. & Feldman, M. W. Evolution of learning strategies in temporally and spatially variable 
environments: a review of theory. Theoretical population biology 91, 3-19 (2014). 
25 Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Culture and the evolutionary process.  (University of Chicago Press, 
1985). 
26 MacCoun, R. J. The burden of social proof: Shared thresholds and social influence. Psychological 
review 119, 345 (2012). 
27 Nowak, A., Szamrej, J. & Latané, B. From private attitude to public opinion: A dynamic theory 
of social impact. Psychological Review 97, 362-376, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.97.3.362 (1990). 
28 Tanford, S. & Penrod, S. Computer modeling of influence in the jury: The role of the 
consistent juror. Social Psychology Quarterly 46, 200-212 (1983). 
29 Tanford, S. & Penrod, S. Social Influence Model: A formal integration of research on majority 
and minority influence processes. Psychological Bulletin 95, 189-225, doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.95.2.189 (1984). 
30 Smaldino, P. E., Calanchini, J. & Pickett, C. L. Theory development with agent-based models. 
Organizational Psychology Review 5, 300-317 (2015). 
31 Murphy, S. C. et al. The role of overconfidence in romantic desirability and competition. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41, 1036-1052 (2015). 
32 Hamilton, W. D. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. Journal of theoretical biology 7, 
17-52 (1964). 
33 Traulsen, A. Mathematics of kin ‐ and group ‐ selection: formally equivalent? Evolution: 
International Journal of Organic Evolution 64, 316-323 (2010). 
34 Birch, J. Hamilton’s rule and its discontents. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65, 
381-411 (2013). 
35 Nowak, M. A., McAvoy, A., Allen, B. & Wilson, E. O. The general form of Hamilton’s rule 
makes no predictions and cannot be tested empirically. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 201701805 (2017). 
36 Norenzayan, A. et al. The cultural evolution of prosocial religions. Behavioral and brain sciences 
39, e1 (2016). 
37 Bidgood, J. in The New York Times    (New York, 2017). 
38 Laland, K. N., Sterelny, K., Odling-Smee, J., Hoppitt, W. & Uller, T. Cause and effect in 
biology revisited: is Mayr’s proximate-ultimate dichotomy still useful? science 334, 1512-1516 
(2011). 
39 Laland, K. N. Darwin's unfinished symphony: how culture made the human mind.  (Princeton University 
Press, 2017). 
40 Wingfield, J. C., Lynn, S. E. & Soma, K. K. Avoiding the ‘costs’ of testosterone: ecological 
bases of hormone-behavior interactions. Brain, behavior and evolution 57, 239-251 (2001). 
41 Gabi, M. et al. No relative expansion of the number of prefrontal neurons in primate and 
human evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, 9617-9622 (2016). 
42 Nelson, L. D., Simmons, J. & Simonsohn, U. Psychology's Renaissance. Annual Review of 
Psychology 69, 511-534, doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011836 (2018). 
43 Laland, K. N. et al. The extended evolutionary synthesis: its structure, assumptions and 
predictions. Proc. R. Soc. B 282, 20151019 (2015). 
44 Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. & Feldman, M. W. Cultural transmission and evolution: a quantitative approach.  
(Princeton University Press, 1981). 
45 Boyd, R. A different kind of animal: how culture transformed our species: how culture transformed our species.  
(Princeton University Press, 2017). 
46 Campbell, D. T. On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and between 
psychology and moral tradition. American psychologist 30, 1103 (1975). 
47 Campbell, D. T. Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. Social Change in 
Developing Area (1965). 
48 Campbell, D. T. Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in other 
knowledge processes. Psychological review 67, 380 (1960). 
49 Muthukrishna, M. et al. Beyond WEIRD Psychology: Measuring and Mapping Scales of 
Cultural and Psychological Distance. SSRN, doi:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259613 (2018). 
50 Lumsden, C. J. & Wilson, E. O. Genes, mind, and culture: The coevolutionary process.  (Harvard 
University Press, 1981). 
51 Pulliam, H. R. & Dunford, C. Programmed to learn: An essay on the evolution of culture.  (Columbia 
University Press, 1980). 
52 Richerson, P. J., Bettinger, R. L. & Boyd, R. Evolution on a restless planet: Were 
environmental variability and environmental change major drivers of human evolution. 
Handbook of evolution 2, 223-242 (2005). 
53 Zachos, J., Pagani, M., Sloan, L., Thomas, E. & Billups, K. Trends, Rhythms, and Aberrations 
in Global Climate 65 Ma to Present. Science 292, 686-693, doi:10.1126/science.1059412 (2001). 
54 Chudek, M., Muthukrishna, M. & Henrich, J. in The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology Vol. 2  
(ed David M. Buss) Ch. 30, (John Wiley and Sons, 2015). 
55 Cialdini, R. B. & Goldstein, N. J. Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annual Review 
of Psychology 55, 591-621 (2004). 
56 Bond, R. & Smith, P. B. Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch's 
(1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin 119, 111-137, doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.119.1.111 (1996). 
57 Muthukrishna, M., Morgan, T. J. H. & Henrich, J. The When and Who of Social Learning and 
Conformist Transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior 37, 10-20 (2016). 
58 Morgan, T., Rendell, L., Ehn, M., Hoppitt, W. & Laland, K. The evolutionary basis of human 
social learning. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279, 653-662 (2012). 
59 Efferson, C., Lalive, R., Richerson, P. J., McElreath, R. & Lubell, M. Conformists and 
mavericks: the empirics of frequency-dependent cultural transmission. Evolution and Human 
Behavior 29, 56-64 (2008). 
60 Nakahashi, W., Wakano, J. Y. & Henrich, J. Adaptive social learning strategies in temporally 
and spatially varying environments. Human Nature 23, 386-418 (2012). 
61 Persky, J. Retrospectives: the ethology of homo economicus. The journal of economic perspectives, 
221-231 (1995). 
62 Henrich, J. et al. In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies. American Economic Review, 73-78 (2001). 
63 Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society, 263-291 (1979). 
64 Gintis, H. Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics. Ecological 
economics 35, 311-322 (2000). 
65 Thaler, R. H. From homo economicus to homo sapiens. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 133-
141 (2000). 
66 Jensen, K., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. Chimpanzees are rational maximizers in an ultimatum 
game. science 318, 107-109 (2007). 
67 Angrist, J. D. & Pischke, J.-S. The credibility revolution in empirical economics: How better 
research design is taking the con out of econometrics. Journal of economic perspectives 24, 3-30 
(2010). 
68 Camerer, C. F. et al. Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science 
351, 1433-1436, doi:10.1126/science.aaf0918 (2016). 
69 Besley, T. & Persson, T. Democratic Values and Institutions. Working Paper (2016). 
70 Francois, P. & Zabojnik, J. Trust, social capital, and economic development. Journal of the 
European Economic Association 3, 51-94 (2005). 
71 Bear, A. & Rand, D. G. Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113, doi:10.1073/pnas.1517780113 
(2015). 
72 Gold, J. I. & Shadlen, M. N. Neural computations that underlie decisions about sensory 
stimuli. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5, 10-16, doi:10/bw4p5n (2001). 
73 Heeger, D. J. Theory of cortical function. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, 1773-
1782, doi:10/f9wqpj (2017). 
74 Dayan, P. & Niv, Y. Reinforcement learning: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. Current 
Opinion in Neurobiology 18, 185-196, doi:10/c2bzz2 (2008). 
75 Griffiths, T. L., Kemp, C. & Tenenbaum, J. B. in The Cambridge Handbook of Computational 
Psychology   (ed Ron Sun)  59-100 (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
76 Freedman, L. P., Cockburn, I. M. & Simcoe, T. S. The Economics of Reproducibility in 
Preclinical Research. PLOS Biology 13, e1002165, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002165 (2015). 
77 Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology. Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology, 
<https://elifesciences.org/collections/9b1e83d1/reproducibility-project-cancer-biology> 
(2018). 
78 Lea, A. J., Tung, J., Archie, E. A. & Alberts, S. C. Developmental plasticity: Bridging research 
in evolution and human health. Evolution, Medicine, and Public Health 2017, 162-175, 
doi:10.1093/emph/eox019 (2017). 
79 Wells, J. C. K., Nesse, R. M., Sear, R., Johnstone, R. A. & Stearns, S. C. Evolutionary public 
health: introducing the concept. The Lancet 390, 500-509, doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(17)30572-
X (2017). 
80 Gluckman, P., Beedle, A., Buklijas, T., Low, F. & Hanson, M. Principles of evolutionary medicine.  
(Oxford University Press, 2016). 
81 Stearns, S. C., Nesse, R. M., Govindaraju, D. R. & Ellison, P. T. Evolutionary perspectives on 
health and medicine. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 1691-1695, doi:10/bpc263 
(2010). 
82 Nesse, R. M. et al. Making evolutionary biology a basic science for medicine. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 107, 1800-1807, doi:10/d3crt7 (2010). 
83 Kerr, N. L. HARKing: Hypothesizing after the results are known. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review 2, 196-217 (1998). 
84 Mischel, W. The toothbrush problem. Association for Psychological Science Observer 21 (2009). 
85 Han, S. H. et al. A Cultural Neuroscience Approach to the Biosocial Nature of the Human 
Brain. Annu Rev Psychol 64, 335-359 (2013). 
86 Bolger, D. J., Perfetti, C. A. & Schneider, W. Cross‐cultural effect on the brain revisited: 
Universal structures plus writing system variation. Human brain mapping 25, 92-104 (2005). 
87 Tan, L. H., Laird, A. R., Li, K. & Fox, P. T. Neuroanatomical correlates of phonological 
processing of Chinese characters and alphabetic words: A meta‐analysis. Human brain mapping 
25, 83-91 (2005). 
88 Kobayashi, C., Glover, G. H. & Temple, E. Cultural and linguistic influence on neural bases 
of ‘Theory of Mind’: an fMRI study with Japanese bilinguals. Brain and language 98, 210-220 
(2006). 
89 LeWinn, K. Z., Sheridan, M. A., Keyes, K. M., Hamilton, A. & McLaughlin, K. A. Sample 
composition alters associations between age and brain structure. Nature Communications 8, 874, 
doi:10.1038/s41467-017-00908-7 (2017). 
90 Coan, J. A., Schaefer, H. S. & Davidson, R. J. Lending a hand: Social regulation of the neural 
response to threat. Psychological science 17, 1032-1039 (2006). 
91 Coan, J. A. et al. Relationship status and perceived support in the social regulation of neural 
responses to threat. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 12, 1574-1583, 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsx091 (2017). 
92 Savalei, V. & Dunn, E. Is the call to abandon p-values the red herring of the replicability crisis? 
Frontiers in Psychology 6, 245, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00245 (2015). 
93 Trotta, R. Bayes in the sky: Bayesian inference and model selection in cosmology. Contemporary 
Physics 49, 71-104 (2008). 
94 Nielsen, M., Haun, D., Kärtner, J. & Legare, C. H. The persistent sampling bias in 
developmental psychology: A call to action. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 162, 31-38 
(2017). 
95 Talhelm, T. et al. Large-scale psychological differences within China explained by rice versus 
wheat agriculture. Science 344, 603-608 (2014). 
96 Dobzhansky, T. Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. American 
Biology Teacher 35, 125-129 (1973). 
97 Wilson, M. & Daly, M. Competitiveness, risk taking, and violence: The young male syndrome. 
Ethology and sociobiology 6, 59-73 (1985). 
98 Daly, M. & Wilson, M. Homicide.  (Transaction Publishers, 1988). 
99 Richerson, P. J. & Boyd, R. Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution.  (University 
of Chicago Press, 2005). 
100 Barkow, J. H., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J.     (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1992). 
101 Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. Evolutionary psychology: new perspectives on cognition and 
motivation. Annual review of psychology 64, 201 (2013). 
102 Confer, J. C. et al. Evolutionary psychology: Controversies, questions, prospects, and 
limitations. American Psychologist 65, 110 (2010). 
103 Fincher, C. L., Thornhill, R., Murray, D. R. & Schaller, M. Pathogen prevalence predicts 
human cross-cultural variability in individualism/collectivism. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences 275, 1279-1285 (2008). 
104 Hruschka, D. et al. Impartial Institutions, Pathogen Stress and the Expanding Social Network. 
Human Nature 25, 567-579 (2014). 
105 Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J. & Myles, S. How culture shaped the human genome: bringing 
genetics and the human sciences together. Nature Reviews Genetics 11, 137-148 (2010). 
106 Buss, D. M. The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology.  (Wiley, 2015). 
107 Hoppitt, W. & Laland, K. N. Social Learning: An Introduction to Mechanisms, Methods, and Models.  
(Princeton University Press, 2013). 
108 Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J. & Henrich, J. The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential for 
human adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, 10918-10925 (2011). 
109 Nielsen, M., Subiaul, F., Galef, B., Zentall, T. & Whiten, A. Social learning in humans and 
nonhuman animals: theoretical and empirical dissections. Journal of Comparative Psychology 126, 
109 (2012). 
110 Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S. & Hopper, L. M. Emulation, imitation, over-
imitation and the scope of culture for child and chimpanzee. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 364, 2417-2428 (2009). 
111 Claidière, N. & Whiten, A. Integrating the study of conformity and culture in humans and 
nonhuman animals. Psychological bulletin 138, 126 (2012). 
112 Chudek, M. & Henrich, J. Culture–gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of 
human prosociality. Trends in cognitive sciences 15, 218-226 (2011). 
113 Schmidt, M. F. & Tomasello, M. Young children enforce social norms. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 21, 232-236 (2012). 
114 Brown, G. R., Dickins, T. E., Sear, R. & Laland, K. N. Evolutionary accounts of human 
behavioural diversity. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366, 313-
324 (2011). 
115 McElreath, R., Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Shared norms and the evolution of ethnic markers. 
Current Anthropology 44, 122-130 (2003). 
116 Efferson, C., Lalive, R. & Fehr, E. The coevolution of cultural groups and ingroup favoritism. 
Science 321, 1844-1849 (2008). 
117 Moya, C. Evolved priors for ethnolinguistic categorization: A case study from the Quechua–
Aymara boundary in the Peruvian Altiplano. Evolution and Human Behavior 34, 265-272 (2013). 
118 Atran, S. & Henrich, J. The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive 
Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments 
to Prosocial Religion. Biological Theory 5, 18-30 (2010). 
119 Bell, A. V., Richerson, P. J. & McElreath, R. Culture rather than genes provides greater scope 
for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
106, 17671-17674 (2009). 
120 Norenzayan, A. & Shariff, A. F. The origin and evolution of religious prosociality. science 322, 
58-62 (2008). 
121 Richerson, P. et al. Cultural Group Selection Plays an Essential Role in Explaining Human 
Cooperation: A Sketch of the Evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39 (2016). 
122 Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., Sell, A., Lieberman, D. & Sznycer, D. in Handbook of approach and 
avoidance motivation Vol. 251    (Lawrence Erlbaum Mahwah, NJ, 2008). 
123 von Hippel, W. & Trivers, R. The evolution and psychology of self-deception. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 34, 1-16 (2011). 
124 Buss, D. M. How can evolutionary psychology successfully explain personality and individual 
differences? Perspectives on Psychological Science 4, 359-366 (2009). 
125 Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. & Nowak, M. A. Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature 
489, 427-430 (2012). 
126 Whiten, A. & Erdal, D. The human socio-cognitive niche and its evolutionary origins. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 367, 2119-2129 (2012). 
127 Pinker, S. The language instinct: The new science of language and mind. Vol. 7529 (Penguin UK, 1995). 
128 Muthukrishna, M. & Henrich, J. Innovation in the collective brain. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 371, doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0192 (2016). 
129 Fox, K. C., Muthukrishna, M. & Shultz, S. The social and cultural roots of whale and dolphin 
brains. Nature ecology & evolution (2017). 
130 Laland, K. N., Atton, N. & Webster, M. M. From fish to fashion: experimental and theoretical 
insights into the evolution of culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 366, 958-968 (2011). 
131 Muthukrishna, M., Doebeli, M., Chudek, M. & Henrich, J. The Cultural Brain Hypothesis: 
How culture drives brain expansion, sociality, and life history. PLOS Computational Biology 
(forthcoming). 
132 Lipschuetz, M. et al. A large head circumference is more strongly associated with unplanned 
cesarean or instrumental delivery and neonatal complications than high birthweight. American 
journal of obstetrics and gynecology 213, 833. e831-833. e812 (2015). 
133 Dominguez-Bello, M. G. et al. Partial restoration of the microbiota of cesarean-born infants 
via vaginal microbial transfer. Nature medicine 22, 250 (2016). 
134 Ravelli, G.-P., Stein, Z. A. & Susser, M. W. Obesity in young men after famine exposure in 
utero and early infancy. New England Journal of Medicine 295, 349-353 (1976). 
135 St Clair, D. et al. Rates of adult schizophrenia following prenatal exposure to the Chinese 
famine of 1959-1961. Jama 294, 557-562 (2005). 
136 Muthukrishna, M., Francois, P., Pourahmadi, S. & Henrich, J. Corrupting cooperation and 
how anti-corruption strategies may backfire. Nature Human Behaviour 1, 0138 (2017). 
137 Muthukrishna, M. Corruption, Cooperation, and the Evolution of Prosocial Institutions. 
SSRN, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082315 (2017). 
138 Henrich, J. Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 53, 3-35 (2004). 
139 Henrich, J., Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. The puzzle of monogamous marriage. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 367, 657-669 (2012). 
140 Slingerland, E. & Sullivan, B. Durkheim with Data: The Database of Religious History. Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion 85, 312-347 (2017). 
141 Sullivan, B., Muthukrishna, M., Tappenden, F. S. & Slingerland, E. Exploring the challenges 
and potentialities of the database of religious history for cognitive historiography. Journal of 
Cognitive Historiography 3 (2016). 
COMPETING INTERESTS 
The authors declare no competing interests. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We would like to thank Tim Besley, Natasha Griffiths, Steve Heine, Keith Jensen, Kevin 
Laland, Daniel Muthukrishna, Stephanie Salgado, and Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington for their 
helpful comments. 
 
